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ver time, the public has simply ceased to 
believe judges when say that they follow 
the law, and nothing but. If judges impose their 
ideological policy preferences, the argument 
goes, why should they be independent from 
political controls, when other policymakers are 
not? We have reached the point where, when 
judges seek to defend the customs and conven-
tions that have guarded against incursions upon 
their independence by arguing that “we are 
all about the law and nothing else,”  the public 
response has increasingly become,  “No, no, no, 
your nose is growing.”
 The collapse of independence conventions 
was facilitated by what I’ve described earlier 
as a protracted erosion of support for the role 
of judicial independence in the rule of law 
paradigm. One possibility is to shrug, let judicial 
independence collapse under its own weight, 
and welcome a judiciary that is more responsive 
to partisan and majoritarian pressures. That 
response would make sense if judicial indepen-
dence is to blame for its own undoing.
 But in my view, the problem does not lie 
with judicial independence itself, but with how 
judicial independence is conceptualized in the 
rule of law paradigm. The long-term solution 
is not to jettison judicial independence, but to 
tweak the guiding paradigm, in favor of what I 
rename a “legal culture paradigm.” 
 The legal culture paradigm I propose begins 
from the premise that judges take law seriously, 
and when they announce to the world that they 
are doing their best to uphold the law, that is 
what they are acculturated to do. 
 Second, likewise, beginning in law school, 
and continuing in practice, future judges are 
exposed to pervasive legal indeterminacy. Law 
students learn to exploit indeterminacy by 
arguing both sides of difficult legal questions, 
divorced from their own policy preferences, to 
the end of making them more effective advo-
cates in an adversarial system of justice.
 Third, future judges, again, beginning as law 
students, resolve indeterminate legal questions 
with reference to competing policy arguments 
that aid them in deciding which of two compa-
rably plausible interpretations of law is best. The 
argument judges find most persuasive can be 
informed by their background, their education, 
their life experience, their common sense, and 
their policy perspectives, aided by a strategic 
sense of the political context in which the case 
arose. That is not judging gone rogue, that is 
judging gone right. 
 The virtue of a legal culture paradigm is that 
it defends an independent judiciary in terms 
that social science verifies, and the public can 
accept. The problem that I’m trying to address is 
the problem of pretending that judges just call 
balls and strikes. It is more complicated than 
that, and the public is able to handle that truth. 
But by honestly acknowledging the role that 
extralegal influences can play in judicial deci-
sion-making, the legal culture paradigm has to 
allow for the possibility of gratuitous policymak-
ing, in some cases, in which judges abuse their 
independence by disregarding the law that they 
are acculturated to follow, knowingly or not, and 
imposing their own policy predilections.
 Accordingly, the legal culture paradigm needs 
to envision a more robust role for accountability, 
relative to the rule of law paradigm, to deter that 
kind of gratuitous policymaking and preserve 
public confidence. Without disputing the role 
that Congress plays in promoting accountabil-
ity, the additional accountability that the legal 
culture paradigm envisions can be supplied in 
large part by intra-judicial mechanisms already in 
place that pose no meaningful threat to judicial 
independence.  
 It is unrealistic to hope that a modest reboot 
of the prevailing paradigm can by itself quiet 
the polarized partisan political fury and restore 
respect for an independent judiciary. In the 
short term, we must brace for a period of strug-
gle akin to unrestrained, hardball litigation, in 
which pokes to the eye of established judicial 
independence conventions by partisans on one 
side of the aisle will elicit reciprocal pokes by 
partisans on the other side, in lieu of unheeded 
warnings not to poke at all.
 Ultimately, however, hardball litigation is 
exhausting. Running a government without guid-
ing conventions is chaotic, and therein lies hope. 
The more insufferable and unrestrained hardball 
gets, the more attractive the alternative of settle-
ment becomes. A key to enabling settlement is 
to bring the parties together in a quieter and less 
formal setting to promote candor and discourage 
posturing for the benefit of external audiences.
 Beginning in the late 1970s, the Brookings 
Institution hosted a series of conferences in 
Williamsburg, Virginia, and elsewhere. Those 
conferences brought representatives of all three 
branches of government together to discuss 
court-related issues for the purpose of improv-
ing inter-branch communication and promot-
ing mutual understanding of the challenges 
confronting the judiciary.
 And so, I look forward to a time when we can 
convene a series of tri-branch summits in the 
spirit of the Williamsburg conferences, once the 
adversaries are willing and receptive to meet. 
These summits could address such topics as 
the role of an independent and accountable 
judiciary in American government; the state of 
constitutional conventions that have served to 
protect an independent judiciary from encroach-
ment; the need for procedural conventions; 
the appointments process; promoting a stable 
system of selection; and an independent, 
accountable judiciary. 
 It’s premature to convene these summits 
until the populist wave has crested, and the 
disputants are prepared to meet and listen. 
There is, however, room for optimism that the 
current appeal of the Biblical edict, “An eye for 
an eye,” will eventually yield the wisdom of 
Mahatma Gandhi’s admonition that an eye for 
an eye makes the whole world blind. *
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